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Open Access

Is freedom of the will neutrally possible?

  • Philip Kargopoulos1
Annals of General Psychiatry20109(Suppl 1):S9

https://doi.org/10.1186/1744-859X-9-S1-S9

Published: 22 April 2010

Keywords

Public HealthCausal ConsequenceCognitive ScienceStrong CommitmentResult Component

In this paper we are attempting in the context of recent developments in cognitive science to examine the viability of the Libet solution to the problem of the freedom of the will. We will be showing that this solution is still possible if refraining acts can be considered not only as different kinds of actions from performing acts, but also peculiar actions that have causal consequences without having a result component. It requires a very strong commitment to an odd model of action, which makes more plausible the Wegner idea that freedom of the will is to be explained away as an illusion, albeit an illusion that is helpful in establishing the authorship of actions.

Authors’ Affiliations

(1)
School of Psychology Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece

Copyright

© Kargopoulos; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 2009

This article is published under license to BioMed Central Ltd.

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