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Is freedom of the will neutrally possible?

In this paper we are attempting in the context of recent developments in cognitive science to examine the viability of the Libet solution to the problem of the freedom of the will. We will be showing that this solution is still possible if refraining acts can be considered not only as different kinds of actions from performing acts, but also peculiar actions that have causal consequences without having a result component. It requires a very strong commitment to an odd model of action, which makes more plausible the Wegner idea that freedom of the will is to be explained away as an illusion, albeit an illusion that is helpful in establishing the authorship of actions.

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Correspondence to Philip Kargopoulos.

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Open Access This article is published under license to BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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Kargopoulos, P. Is freedom of the will neutrally possible?. Ann Gen Psychiatry 9, S9 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1186/1744-859X-9-S1-S9

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Keywords

  • Public Health
  • Causal Consequence
  • Cognitive Science
  • Strong Commitment
  • Result Component